by Carl Gillett and Barry Loewer(editors) Cambridge University Press, 2001 Review by Jeremy Wanderer, Ph.D. on Sep 4th 2002 
Bold metaphysical claims of the form
‘everything there is is X’, where X could be something such as water or mind or
matter and such like, are familiar features of the philosophical landscape. In
a certain sense, the doctrine of physicalism involves just such a bold claim,
to the effect that everything there is is physical, or, as it is more often put
more precisely in contemporary parlance, everything supervenes on the physical.
In another sense however, physicalism is less bold than other such metaphysical
claims, since most formulations of physicalism fail to prescribe just what the
physical is, beyond transferring responsibility for answering this question to
the findings of the physical sciences. (In this sense, physicalism differs from
materialism, for the latter does prescribe just what the X is, involving a
distinct conception of matter).
As the editors of this collection of essays
note in the preface, some tacit acceptance of physicalism has exerted an
influence over much contemporary philosophy, and the aim of the collection is
to subject this doctrine to a degree of critical scrutiny. The seventeen essays
are divided into three sections. The first contains essays sympathetic to
physicalism, including attempts at a precise formulation, tracing its
historical development, an account of its relationship with physics and a
justifcatory defence of its doctrinal status. Essays in the second section are
largely critical of aspects of physicalism, including a focus on its
metaphysical presuppositions and methodological implications. The third section
focuses on the ramifications that the doctrine has for the study of
consciousness, containing essays both for and against the possibility of a
physicalist account in this area.
The relative lengths of the sections is
revealing, with the first section lasting almost two hundred pages as opposed
to the seventy or so pages of the second. Crude though such a measure may be,
it reflects the fact that there is a distinct disparity in the depth of the
discussion between the two sections. The first section contains a series of
arguments in favour of physicalism and
poses problems facing prominent ‘physicalist opponents’ such as
Davidson, Burge, McDowell and Hornsby. Neither the arguments nor the problems
are addressed in the second section. Further, well-known challenges for
physicalism, particularly questions that arise from the issues of meaning and
intentionality, are largely ignored. (Indeed, the terms do not even feature in
the book’s index). Whilst it may justifiably be claimed that such arguments are
well discussed elsewhere and need no duplication here, these issues nonetheless
motivate much current physicalist discontent and their complete omission makes
the project of a critical evaluation of ‘the reigning physicalist
weltanschauung’ significantly incomplete.
Reflection on essays in the first section
suggests a distinction between what could be called a ‘minimal ontological
physicalism’ and a broader ‘doctrinal physicalism’. The former sees physicalism
as nothing more than the ontological claim highlighted above, whilst the latter
sees physicalism as comprising a series of related claims forming a fuller worldview.
Doctrinal physicalism thus combines the metaphysical claim with others,
including a commitment to reductionism, methodological naturalism, the unity of
science, the causal closure of the physical world and so on. Most of the essays
in the first section focus solely on matters of metaphysics; some (e.g. papers
by Papineau, Loewer) explicitly deny that such minimal physicalism has any
implications for methodology at all, whilst others (e.g. papers by Rey,
Robinson) do consider the implications of a physicalist ontology for questions
methodology and reductionism. Either way, it is the ontological question that
dominates the essays in this collection and therein lies its great strength and
contribution to contemporary discussion in philosophy of mind.
The lay reader looking for a clear overview
of the current debate surrounding physicalism may be best advised to look
elsewhere; no introductory essay is provided and some of the discussion is
technical and assumes a great deal of background knowledge. However, anyone
looking for a state-of-the-art collection of essays discussing current issues
in metaphysics of mind and its implications for consciousness and mental
causation will find this collection useful, rich and provocative in places -
even if it does full short of providing the overall critique of physicalism
that it promises.
© 2002 Jeremy Wanderer
Dr. Jeremy Wanderer is a lecturer in the
philosophy department at the University of Cape Town.
|
